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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALARCON, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Margaret Kelly Michaels ("Michaels") appeals from the 
order granting the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and dismissing her S 1983 claims against them. 
Michaels alleged that the defendants violated her 
constitutional rights by employing coercive interview 
techniques with child witnesses while investigating 
allegations of child abuse made against her. The district 
court granted the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment on three alternative grounds. First, the district 
court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because Michaels's allegations that the 
defendants engaged in an improper investigation did not 
allege a violation of her constitutional rights. The district 
court then ruled that even if the improper investigation did 
violate her constitutional rights, the defendants would 
nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity because those 
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rights were not clearly established at the time of the 
investigation such that a reasonable person in the 
defendants' position would have known that they were 
violating her rights. Finally, the district court concluded 
that, putting the issue of qualified immunity aside, 
Michaels's S 1983 malicious prosecution claim must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Michaels contends 
that each one of the district court's conclusions was 
erroneous. We agree with the district court that the use of 
improper interview techniques in questioning the children 
did not violate any of Michaels's constitutional rights. We 
conclude that the district court correctly determined that 
Michaels failed to demonstrate that her constitutional 
rights were violated. We do not consider its alternative 
grounds for granting summary judgment. 
 
I 
 
A child who attended the Wee Care Nursery School in 
Maplewood, New Jersey, reported to a nurse at his 
pediatrician's office that he had been sexually abused by 
Michaels. Michaels was employed at the nursery school as 
a teacher. On April 30, 1985, Louis Fonnelaras, an 
investigator with the Institutional Abuse Investigation Unit 
of the Division of Youth and Family Services, was assigned 
to investigate the merits of the child's allegation. Mr. 
Fonnelaras informed John Mastroangelo, an investigator 
with the Essex County Prosecutor's Office, of the child's 
accusation. Mr. Mastroangelo notified Sarah Sencer- 
McArdle, the director of the Child Abuse Unit of the 
Prosecutor's Office, of the sexual abuse report. Shortly 
thereafter, four other children made similar allegations 
regarding Michaels's conduct. Ms. Sencer-McArdle 
interviewed each of the children. The evidence she 
discovered induced a grand jury to return an indictment 
against Michaels. 
 
Following the return of the first indictment, other 
children reported additional allegations of sexual 
misconduct by Michaels at the nursery school. After 
interviewing the children, Ms. Sencer-McArdle presented 
the results of her investigation to a second grand jury. The 
Essex County Prosecutor's Office continued to receive 
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reports of sexual misconduct committed against children at 
the Wee Care Nursery School. Ms. Sencer-McArdle 
presented this evidence to a third grand jury after 
conducting additional interviews. During the course of 
these investigations, Mr. Mastroangelo and George 
McGrath, another investigator with the Essex County 
Prosecutor's Office, Susan Esquilin, a psychologist, and Mr. 
Fonnelaras also participated in questioning the children. A 
total of one hundred and sixty-three charges werefiled 
against Michaels in three separate indictments. 
 
On June 22, 1987, the trial regarding these charges was 
commenced in the Superior Court of New Jersey. On April 
15, 1988, the jury convicted Michaels of 115 counts of 
aggravated assault, sexual assault, endangering the welfare 
of children, and terroristic threats. On March 26, 1993, the 
Appellate Division reversed the convictions and remanded 
for a new trial. The court questioned the reliability of the 
methods used to interview the children. The court held 
that, "courts must provide a remedy where the record 
demonstrates that an accuser's testimony is founded upon 
unreliable perceptions, or memory caused by improper 
investigative procedures if it results in a defendant's right 
to a fair trial being irretrievably lost. . . .[and that a] 
factual hearing would be required for this purpose." See 
State v. Michaels, 264 N.J. Super. 579, 631-32 (App. Div. 
1993). The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the 
reversal of the judgment of conviction. See State v. 
Michaels, 136 N.J. 299 (1994). On December 1, 1994, the 
Essex County Prosecutor's Office dismissed all charges 
against Michaels. 
 
On June 13, 1996, Michaels filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey. On July 25, 1996, the 
defendants removed the action to the United States District 
Court, District of New Jersey. Numerous claims and 
defendants were dismissed, either voluntarily or by court 
order, leaving only the claims of malicious prosecution and 
violation of S 1983 against five defendants: Louis 
Fonnelaras, John Mastroangelo, Sarah Sencer-McArdle, 
George McGrath, and Susan Esquilin (collectively"the 
defendants"). The defendants filed motions for summary 
judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. In 
 
                                5 
 
 
May, 26, 1999, the district court granted the motions and 
dismissed the S 1983 claims. The district court remanded 
the common law malicious prosecution claim to the 
Superior Court of New Jersey. Michaels timely filed this 
appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
II 
 
We review a district court's grant of a motion for 
summary judgment de novo. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 
F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is 
appropriate where, viewing the record in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Jones v. School Dist. of 
Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
In analyzing whether a defendant is entitled to the 
dismissal of an action based on the defense of qualified 
immunity, we must first determine "whether the plaintiff's 
claims make out a violation of a constitutional right." Assaf 
v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Siegert v. 
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991)). If we conclude that the 
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right, we 
must then determine whether the defendant violated a 
clearly established right such that a reasonable official in 
the defendant's position would know that his conduct was 
unlawful. See id.; see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 
826 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Government officials performing 
discretionary functions are `shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.' ") (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). These inquiries are 
questions of law that the court must resolve. See Sharrar, 
128 F.3d at 828. 
 
Michaels contends that the district court erred in 
concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity because the interview techniques they employed 
did not violate her constitutional right to due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Michaels argues that the 
rationale of the district court, adopted from the Seventh 
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Circuit's holding in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 
(7th Cir. 1994), is flawed because it "leaves a Section 1983 
Plaintiff, such as Michaels, without recourse." 
 
In Buckley, the plaintiff brought S 1983 claims against 
police officers for allegedly coercing witnesses, and paying 
them money to make false statements against him, in order 
to implicate him in the crime for which he was tried. Id. at 
794. The court held in Buckley that "[c]oercing witnesses to 
speak . . . is a genuine constitutional wrong" that violates 
"the right of the person being interrogated to be free from 
coercion." Id. The court further held, however, that the 
plaintiff could not "complain that the prosecutors may have 
twisted [the witness's] arm" because "[r]ights personal to 
their holders may not be enforced by third parties." Id. at 
794-95 (citations omitted). The court in Buckley  ruled that 
"using one person's coerced confession at another's trial 
violates his rights under the due process clause," but that 
"[p]rosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for actions 
as advocates before the grand jury and at trial even if they 
present unreliable or wholly fictitious proofs." Id. at 795; 
see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) 
(holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity 
from a civil suit for damages under S 1983 in initiating a 
prosecution and in presenting the state's case, including 
deciding which evidence to present). 
 Consistent with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in 
Buckley, the district court in this matter held that the 
techniques used to interview the children during the course 
of the investigation did not violate Michaels's constitutional 
rights. The district court decided that Ms. Sencer-McArdle 
was entitled to absolute immunity in offering the unreliable 
evidence. 
 
Michaels is correct in noting that such a rule leaves a 
plaintiff like herself without recourse. Indeed, the court in 
Buckley recognized this dilemma. 20 F.3d at 795 ("[T]he 
only way Buckley can establish a violation of the 
Constitution is to plead himself out of court."). The United 
States Supreme Court, in upholding absolute prosecutorial 
immunity, also noted that absolute prosecutorial immunity 
may "leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil 
redress," but concluded that the policies served by granting 
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absolute prosecutorial immunity outweighed any gap in a 
plaintiff's recovery. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. This court 
has acknowledged that a person harmed by the actions of 
a prosecutor would not be without any redress, because 
"[h]arm to a falsely-charged defendant is remedied by 
safeguards built into the judicial system - probable cause 
hearings, dismissal of the charges - and into the state 
codes of professional responsibility." Kulwicki v. Dawson, 
969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Michaels suggests that a but for causation analysis 
would be more appropriate to resolving the issue of 
qualified immunity in this instance. To support this 
proposition, Michaels cites to the dissenting opinion in 
Buckley. The dissent in Buckley suggested that prosecutors 
are not immune from liability for their non-advocacy 
wrongful conduct if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
indictment and trial would not have occurred but for the 
wrongful conduct. 20 F.3d at 800 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). 
Judge Fairchild reasoned that the investigation techniques 
employed by the officers in Buckley were the same as 
manufacturing evidence and suborning perjury, actions 
that would be non-advocacy wrongful conduct. See id. 
 
We are persuaded by the reasoning set forth in the 
majority opinion of Buckley. While we recognize that this 
rule may seem harsh to plaintiffs, we are satisfied that the 
remedies set forth in Kulwicki for a falsely-charged 
defendant are sufficient to discourage prosecutors from 
coercing witnesses to make unreliable statements against a 
defendant. Here, for example, Michaels's conviction was 
reversed and the serious charges against her were 
dismissed because the children's testimony was unreliable. 
 
Michaels also attempts to support her argument that her 
constitutional rights were violated by the improper 
techniques used to interview the children by relying on the 
decision in Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 
1997). Michaels asserts that the court in Clanton held that 
the plaintiff had standing to assert a constitutional 
violation of his rights based upon a witness's coerced 
confession. Citing Buckley, the court in Clanton held that "a 
person may challenge the government's use against him or 
her of a coerced confession given by another person." Id. at 
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1157-58 (emphasis added). It recognized a plaintiff's 
constitutional right not to have another person's coerced 
statement used against him in an affidavit for an arrest 
warrant. See id. 
 
The distinction between Buckley and Clanton is the use 
of the improperly obtained statements. In Buckley, the 
witness's coerced testimony was presented at trial. The 
court held that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from 
an action for damages under S 1983 under Imbler. See 20 
F.3d at 795. In Clanton, on the other hand, the police used 
another person's coerced confession in an affidavit to 
obtain an arrest warrant for Clanton. 129 F.3d at 1151. In 
using a coerced statement in this manner, the court held in 
Clanton that the officers were not entitled to qualified 
immunity. See id. at 1159; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 
U.S. 335, 343 (1986) (holding that an officer applying for a 
warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified 
immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity). Here, 
the only use of the improperly obtained statements against 
Michaels was the presentation of the children's testimony 
before the grand jury and at the criminal trial. Until the 
children testified against her, Michaels's constitutional right 
to due process was not violated by the techniques used to 
interview the children. 
 
The district court did not err in concluding that Michaels 
did not demonstrate a violation of her constitutional rights 
when the defendants employed improper interview 
techniques with the children. Thus, all of the defendants 
are entitled to qualified immunity for those acts. 
Furthermore, Ms. Sencer-McArdle is entitled to absolute 
immunity for offering the testimony of the children against 
Michaels before the grand jury in that trial. 
 
III 
 
Michaels also contends that she was denied the 
opportunity to discover evidence as to the proper interview 
techniques for interviewing children regarding allegations of 
sexual abuse in order to demonstrate that the defendants 
violated her clearly established constitutional rights. 
Because we conclude that the questioning of the children 
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did not violate Michaels's constitutional rights, we need not 
consider this question. Furthermore, Michaels'sfinal 
contention, that the district court erred in dismissing her 
malicious prosecution S 1983 claim for failure to state a 
claim, is also unavailing. The district court properly 
dismissed her claims on the basis that the remaining 
defendants were entitled to immunity. Any discussion in 
the district court's order as to whether Michaels stated a 
S 1983 malicious prosecution claim was superfluous. The 
order granting summary judgment can be upheld without 
reaching the court's alternative basis for dismissing the 
action. 
 
IV 
 
The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for 
their acts in interviewing the children because Michaels did 
not demonstrate a violation of her own constitutional 
rights. Ms. Sencer-McArdle is entitled to absolute immunity 
for presenting the children's testimony against Michaels 
before the grand jury and at trial. We therefore AFFIRM the 
order granting the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and dismissing Michaels's federal claims. 
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